Some philosophers and physicists, facing the breakdown of locality, proposed going back to the problem situation before Einstein. Bell himself suggested a possibility of the restoration of the absolute framework presupposed by Lorentz's theory of electrons and aether, because "behind the scenes something is going faster than light."(16) Popper more explicitly stated this possibility(17) :
It is only now, in the light of the new experiments stemming from Bell's work, that the suggestion of replacing Einstein's interpretation by Lorentz's can be made. If there is action at a distance, then there is something like absolute space. If we now have theoretical reasons from quantum theory for introducing absolute simultaneity, then we would have to go back to Lorentz's interpretation.
Popper's opinion, however, is very dubious when we reexamine Lorentz's own comparison of his and Einstein's interpretation of the "Lorentz" transformation in the supplements of his Theory of Electrons.(18) Whereas Lorentz derived this transformation through considering the relation between the true and universal frame of reference (S) and an apparent and local one (S'), Einstein abolished the very distinction between true and apparent or between absolute and relative. The Lorentz transformation became the symmetric interrelation between two inertial systems in the theory of relativity. The crucial difference between the two interpretation is as follows :
(1) The contraction of a measuring rod and the delay of a clock was, according to Lorentz, caused by an electron's movement through aether absolutely at rest. Lorentz explained away these "weird" effects by appealing to aether as a hidden reality. The constant velocity of light was to Lorentz a paradoxical fact to be explained away on ad hoc hypotheses of the unknown causal mechanism of aether.
(2) Einstein considered the contraction of a measuring rod and the delay of a clock, not as causal effects of unknown reality, but as the symmetric effects between S and S' which should be interpreted to be derived from the definition of space-time metric. If we rely on S, then we must say the measuring rod of S' contracts and the clock of S' delays. Symmetrically, if we rely on S', then we must also say the measuring rod of S contracts and the clock of S delays. The hidden causal mechanism was, to Einstein, not only useless, but also contradictory because mathematical formulae of the Lorentz transformation exclude the non-symmetric interpretation. The constant velocity of light was, however paradoxical it might be seem, not to be explained away as exceptional phenomena, but to be accepted as the universal principle which made it possible to reconstruct Newtonian mechanics in combination with the principle of relativity.
It is noteworthy that the relation between Einstein's theory of relativity and Lorentz's theory of aether was similar to that between quantum mechanics and the hidden variable theory. This similarity suggests that the methodology of special relativity was more revolutionary and akin to quantum mechanics than Lorentz's correlations of quantum mechanics on the essentially classical and pre-relativistic model like Lorentz's seems fruitless and retrogressive.
Moreover, there are several arguments against the restoration of the absolute frame of reference. The simultaneous correlation in quantum physics is different from a Newtonian type of action at a distance. The former is probabilistic and non-controllable whereas the latter is deterministic and controllable. So we cannot send information with a superluminous speed on the basis of the distant simultaneous correlation in quantum physics. We cannot acquire information through the random sequence of measured values at one side without comparing them with the results of the other side. As the coincidence of two contingent events cannot be used for sending information with a superluminous speed for the purpose of synchronizing two clocks at a distance, the empirical test of Bell's theorem does not make Einstein's theory of relativity invalid through the alleged discovery of prohibited action. We may theoretically introduce absolute simultaneity, but we do not have any experimental arrangement to detect the existence of the absolute frame of reference.
Instead of the restoration of an abolished classical theory, Stapp made a radically progressive trial of introducing something like absolute time by supposing the deep structure below Lorentz invariant phenomena.(19) This structure was described by him as that of events which have the absolutely linear order of "coming into existence". Stapp's theory had an ontological background provided by Hartshorne's version of process metaphysics, according to which the ultimate realities are events and the whole universe has a cumulative structure of creative advance with a cosmic simultaneous "front" of actuality. The purpose of Stapp's theory was to ensure both the macroscopic causality properties with Lorentz-invariance and all of quantum theory on the basis of his metaphysics of events. We may say that Stapp replaces the classical concept of aether with the absolute world of events which are logically prior to space-time. The main characteristic of Stapp's theory was that he adopted the absolute and universal concept of existence in which what comes into existence does not depend on a space-time standpoint, whereas Einstein's theory of relativity relied on the relative and local concept of existence in which what comes into existence depends on a space-time standpoint. As the breakdown of the Bell inequality requires some events to depend on other events whose positions lie outside their backward light-cones, Stapp postulated that the sequence of actualized events should be well-ordered even in the case of spatially distant events.
Though I agree with Stapp that the ontological framework of events is necessary for the unified picture of the world, I do not think he is justified in introducing the absolutely well-ordered structure of events. Einstein's theory of relativity which only admits the partially-ordered structure of events seems more plausible the consideration of the Bell-Aspect experiment.
In the simplest cases of Bell's phenomena there are four events E0 E1 E2 , E3 whose locations Lo ,L1, L2, and L3, lie in four well-separated experimental areas Ao,A1, A2 and A3. If all events lie in the well-ordered sequence of occurrence as Stapp assumed, there must be an unambiguous temporal order between E1 and E2 : one of the two events must be prior to the other. Suppose E1 is the prior to E2. Then E2 depends on what the experimenter in Al has decided to do whereas El is independent of what the experimenter in A2 will decide to do. So he reduced the "simultaneous" correlation between E1 and E2 to the unilateral influence of one upon the other. The difficulty of the above picture is that there does not seem to be any experimental apparatus to determine which is prior, El or E2. Though we guess that an influence or superluminous signal must have gone from Ll to L2, or from L2 to L1, we do not know yet which one is the cause of the other. There is the remnant of classical causality in Stapp's model in which the mutuality or interdependence of quantum phenomena totally disappears. In other words, Stapp's model does not seem to consider the "individuality" of quantum system which Bohr emphasized in his doctrine of complementarity between space-time coordination and causality. This "individuality" can be expressed as the organic interdependence between parts of the quantum system : the whole may be in a definite state, i.e. may have as definite properties as quantum theory permits,' without its parts being in definite state. The two particles of the imaginary experiment in the EPR argument and the two photons of Aspect's experiment are examples of the inseparable parts of an "individual" organism. In this organic unity there cannot be a determinate causal order between all parts of the whole. In the above case there remains the essential ambiguity of causal order between E1 and E2 because their correlation is symmetrical and not detectable until we monitor and record it in L3, i.e. the common causal future of Ll and L2. This ambiguity is characteristic of the relativistic framework of space-time, and any attempt of restoring the absolute framework tends to violate not only the principle of relativity but also the principle of complementarity between space-time coordination and causality.
In the next section I will present another
model which aims at synthesizing the principle of relativity and
quantum correlation on the basis of the philosophy organism. In
this model events are, as in Stapp's and Hartshorne's process
me physics, basic ontological categories from which material objects
and space-time are derived. The background philosophy of organism
is more similar to Whitehead's own
cosmology than Stapp's and Hartshorne's revised version, for the
fundamental vision of Whitehead's philosophy is, as Nobo clearly
explicated(20), the mutual immanence of discrete events
regardless of their temporal relationship (20), whereas
"process" philosophers seem to stress only the immanence
of earlier events in later ones. We will find that the immanence
of later events in earlier ones and contemporaries in each other
are indispensable for the understanding of quantum correlation.
The "organic" model of quantum reality is also similar
to the Hua-yen Buddhist doctrine of simultaneous interfusion and
interpenetration signifying unity-in-multiplicity, for it rejects
the notion of independent self-existence which Hua-yen Buddhists
called svabhava in their doctrines of pratitya-samutpada
(interdependent origination).(21) The concept of the
absolute frame of reference should replaced with the idea of thoroughgoing
relativity : we need not postulate t absolutely unique temporal
order. Even the absolute world of four-dimension space-time as
prefixed reality in Einstein's theory of relativity should be
abolished if we take into account the complementarity between
space-time coordination a causality. If we are, as Bohr aptly
stated, simultaneously actors as well as spectators on the great
stage of life, the image of a scientist as an outside spectator
should be replaced with that of a participating observer inseparably
involved in the object to be observed.